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ABSTRACT
It is well-known that the Nash equilibrium solution of a two- 
person nonzero-sum linear differential game with a quadratic cost function 
can be expressed in terms of the solution of coupled generalized Riccati- 
type matrix differential equations. For high order games the numerical 
determination of the solution of the nonlinear coupled equations may be 
difficult or even not possible when the application dictates the use of 
small memory computers. In this paper a series solution is suggested by 
means of a parameter imbedding method. Instead of solving a high order 
Riccati matrix equation, a lower order matrix Riccati equation corresponding 
to a zero-sum game is solved. In addition, lower order linear equations 
have to be solved. These solutions to lower order equations are the 
coefficients of the series solution for the nonzero-sum game. Cost 
functions corresponding to truncated solutions are compared with those 
for exact Nash equilibrium solutions.
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11, Introduction
Consider a two-person linear differential game described by
x = A x + + B2~2 s
5 (to) = &>*
( 1 )
( 2 )
where the n-vector x is the state of the game, the m^-vector is the
strategy of player 1, the m2~vector u2 is the strategy of player 2, A, B ^
and B2 are nxn, nxm^, and nxn^ matrices whose elements are piecewise
continuous in time t, and t is a fixed instant of time. The cost functiono
for player i is
Ji(ülî^ 2) = ^ * f ’5if 2f> + ^i»£üüi^ +
(3)
for i = 1,2, where j = 2 when i = 1, and j - 1 when i - 2. The terminal
time t is fixed, and Q., R.. and R.. are symmetric matrices whose elements f ~i ~ n  ~ij
are piece-wise continuous in t. Furthermore R ^  > 0, R22 > 0, R 2^ < 0,
R21 < ° 5 Slf - ° »  S2f — ° s 2i - °» and ?2 - °° A11 °f the above matrices
are assumed to be known to both players.
Whereas minmax strategies are natural choices for zero-sum games,
the latitude for "reasonable" strategies for nonzero-sum games is much wider.
For example, depending on the nature of the information available to each
player and the possibility of cooperation or noncooperation, different
attributes for the strategies may be desirable. Minmax noninferior, and Nash
equilibrium solutions have been investigated before [1,2]. Furthermore,
2open-loop and feedback Nash strategies generally lead to different values 
for the cost functions [2],
For nonzero sum linear games with quadratic cost functions the 
minmax strategies and noninferior strategies are obtained by solving decoupled 
Riccati-type matrix equations. However, the Nash strategies are obtained 
from coupled Riccati-type matrix equations.
A strategy set (u^, u^) i-s called a Nash equilibrium strategy set 
if
Ji (Hi ’-2> > V sÎ.ïïÎ). (4)
J2 ^-l’-2') > J2 (UpU*). (5)
If = 0, the game is zero-sum. It has been shown [1] that if u^ and
U2 are required to be feedback functions of x, the Nash equilibrium strategies 
are
51 S. x~i ~ (6 )
where satisfies the generalized matrix Riccati equations
S. ■ -A* S. - S. A - Q. + S.B.r 7}b !S. + S. B .RTtB'.S .~i -- 1 ~i-
+ s .b .r T^b '.s . - s .b .r TIr : .r T V . s .. , s . ( 0  = s.£ (7)
for i - 1,2, where j = 2 when i 1 and j = 1 when i = 2. Sufficient 
conditions which guarantee the existence of solutions S, and S0 for 
t < t < t^ are given by Rhodes [3].
3Equation (7) for i - 1,2 represents coupled nonlinear matrix 
differential equations. and S2 are nxn matrices but since they are
symmetric, there are n(n+l) different:'-variables ;a If n is large, the 
numerical determination of the solution of these n(n+l) coupled nonlinear 
differential equations could be quite formidable. Furthermore, in 
applications where the solutions have ta be obtained "on-line" using 
limited computational capability, the solution of these n(n+l) nonlinear 
differential equations may not be feasible.
In this paper, a parameter imbedding method is employed to 
obtain series solutions for and S2 » Instead of n(n+l) nonlinear 
equations, only n(n+l)/2 nonlinear equations have to be solved. Higher 
order terms in the series require the solution of n(n+l)/2 linear equations 
for each term. However, the set of linear equations for each term has 
the same homogeneous part and only the forcing terms are different. The 
cost functions using the truncated strategies will be compared with the 
exact cost functions. As in all imbedding methods a bonus of the calcu­
lation is that a wider class of problems is solved. The imbedding 
parameter introduced in the paper allows an examination of a two-person 
game which is zero sum when the parameter is zero and when the parameter 
has a value of unity, the solution is an approximation for the original 
problem. However, since the solution is obtained as a power series in 
the parameter, a range of nonzero-sum games with varying degrees of 
asymmetry from the zero-sum condition is automatically studied.
4Thus the sensitivity of the solution to a change in the asymmetry from 
the zero-sum condition is available.
The use of parameter imbedding for obtaining series solutions 
for almost zero-sum games has been investigated before [4]. The method 
in [4] when applied to the linear-quadratic differential game considered 
in this paper will yield the same zeroth order term in the series as the 
imbedding method below. The remaining terms in the series are different 
for the two imbeddings but the two series will yield the same solution 
for unity value of the imbedding parameter. The method discussed below 
leads to simpler calculation of the series.
In optimal control, parameter imbedding has been used to achieve 
computation reduction for the design of large scale systems [5]. The 
method is particularly useful for "weakly coupled" systems because a few 
terms in the series yield a performance index which is close to the optimal 
one [5].
2. Series Solution by Parameter Imbedding 
Consider the equations
. = 1 , -1 -1S. = -A'S -S.A-Q + S.B.R..B.S. + S.B.R. .B'.S . + S .B .R. .B'.S.- l  ~ ~ i  ~i~ ~i  - i - j - j j - j - j  - J - J - J J - J - i
- 1_  -1
S.B.R. .R. .R. .B'.S. , S. (e t ) = S. _ 
- J - J - J J - i J - J J - J - J  - i f  - i f (8 )
i ~ Ij2 , where j - 2 when i — 1 and j — 1 when i = 2 , where
?5
(9)
( 10) 
( I D  
(12)
and e is a scalar parameter. Clearly (8) reduces to (7) when e = l.
Assume the existence and uniqueness of the solution of (8) for all t in
[tQ,t^] and for all e in an interval I which includes [0,1], Since the
right hand side of (8) is a polynomial in , S0, and s, it follows that~l
and are infinitely differentiable with respect to e for all t in 
[tQ,t^] and all e in I [6], Hence and S£ are analytic with respect 
to e in I.
Let the solutions be expanded about e = 0,
S, (e,t) = £~1 i=0
S2 (e >t} = 1=0
— —
b1 S1 (e,t) ie
be1 i!e=0 _
S1 S2 (e1t) ie
be1 i'.e=0 —
(13)
(14)
In this section, the equations that must be satisfied by the coefficients 
in (13) and (14) are presented. The convergence of these series in I is
S'" a
6
guaranteed by the analyticity of and S^. When (13) and (14) are 
evaluated at e = l, the solution for the original nonzero-sum game is 
obtained.
Calculation of S^(0,t) and 8^(0,t)
The zeroth order terms are the solutions of (8) for i-1,2, with 
e set equal to zero:
li " -*’Si - h è - f ^ T 1) + S t i f T ^ X  + +
+ s i M ^ S ,  + s i ^ F ^ S ,  , S, ( 0 , 0  = S i (15)2 /~i 2 /~j
where
E. = B.r TÎb !
F. = b .r 7}r ..r T1b !,~1
(16)
(17)
j = 2 when i = 1 and j =1 when i = 2. The dependence on t has been left out 
for convenience in writing. Although (15) for i = 1,2 are coupled equations, 
S1 (0,t) and 8^(0,t) can be obtained by solving only the lower order matrix 
equation given below. Sufficient conditions which guarantee the existence 
and uniqueness of the solution of the reduced are discussed in Section 3.
Consider the equation
a , „  - /2 i ~%2\ * f ~ l  "  El ~  £2 + ~2V  v  ~lf ~  ?2fS = -A'S - S A -  M -2--) + § 1 2------ js, S(tf) = --------- , (18)
where E*v and F. are, defined in (16) and (17). It is easily verified that
S, (0,t) = s (19)
7and
s2 (o,t) = -S (20)
satisfy (15) for i - 1,2. Thus S^(0,t) and S^iOjt) can be obtained by 
solving (18), and since S is symmetric, this entails solving n(n+l)/2 
coupled nonlinear scalar equations.
Equation (18) is the matrix Riccati equation corresponding to 
the zero-sum differential game (1) with cost functions
(21)
(22)
when and J are given in (3). This is identical to the zeroth order 
term that would be obtained if the imbedding in [4] is applied.
Calculation of First Order Coefficients
Differentiating (8) with respect to e, setting e=0, and 
substituting S^iOjt) = -S^(0,t):
as.~ i A 1 . < s l - E l - 5 2 + *2>
as.
~L as.~L . (E i - E i - E 2 + E2 > .
ae
tx ' h ae ae *  ■ 2 y
(Qt +Q0) (E. +F. - 3E. - 3F.) 3S.
2 ~1 2 Si ’ 3e
§!f + S2f (23)
S^(0,t) can be obtained from the solution of (18), and then substituted in
(23). Thus ds^/be can be obtained by solving the linear equation (23). 
a^/ae is symmetric so that the solution of (23) involves n(n+l)/2 linear
8scalar equations. Notice that for i = 1,2, the homogeneous portion of 
(23) remains the same. Only the forcing terms change.
The coefficients ds^/de and ôs^/ôe described above are different 
from those that would be obtained if the imbedding in [4] were to be 
applied. The equations resulting from (23) for i = 3,2* are much simpler 
because e enters linearly in the coefficients of the matrix equations in 
(8) whereas in the corresponding matrix equations using Starr's imbedding, 
e would enter nonlinearly.
Calculation of kth Order Coefficients
By repeated differentiation of (8) and setting e=0,
dks.~i
3e1
.. „ <Si-Si-52+l2> 3kS.~L •HCO{ [7 <£i - Si ' 52 +e2> /£ ‘Si 2 J 3ek 3ek S- 2 2i
k -1
+ i  2 -
p=1 p.
kl
P '- (k -p )!
3PS,
(E, -F. )
3k' pS.
1 + — :~  (E . - F . ) . , k - p
3k_pS. âPS
3ep 1 - 1 3ek " p 3<=p
3k ' pS.3PS. 3k"PS. 3PS,
+ — “ L(E . - F . ) — ^  ^  (E. -F.) ,ôeP ~J 3ek-p 3ep ~J ~J âek-p
k -1
+ i S ki
3PS.~i
pi(k-p-1 )I 3ep
(E. +F. ) ■■. - - (E. + F.) — :-- -7*
i  ~ i '  3ek - p - l  SeP ~J ~J 3ek - p - l
¡k_p" 1S. 3PS. ~1 . ~1
^k-p-1.
dpS. 3k- p_1S. 3PS .
(E . +F.)
ak-p-ig.
bep ~~y ôek " p_1 3ep
1 (E . +F . ) — :--- 7 1
~J Ôek - P-1
3kS.
dek
= 0
(24)
9Equation (24), for i = 1,2, j = 2 if i = 1, j = 1 if i=2, provides 
an algorithm for solving for the kth order partial derivatives of and S^, 
based on prior calculations of the partial derivatives of and up to 
order k-1. Notice that (24), for i = 1,2 are not coupled, so far as the 
calculation of the kth order partial derivatives is concerned« Furthermore, 
the homogeneous part of (24) does not change with i nor k« In fact the 
homogeneous part is the same for all k > 1. Only the forcing terms change 
for the calculation of the various partial derivatives«
Approximate Nash feedback strategies for players 1 and 2 are 
obtained by truncating the series in (13) and (14), setting e = l, and 
substituting these approximate values of and in (16). The zeroth 
order terms of and are the exact solutions when the game is zero-sum,
i.e., - -C^, E^=F^, ^2 = ”^2 anc* ^lf = ”^2f9 ^  t i^e £ame :*-s not; zero“sum
but.if the norms of E.^+F^, E^ +F2 3 Q ^ + 2 2 3 anc* ^lf + ~2f are muc^ smaH er 
than the corresponding norms of E^-F^, £2 ^ 2 , ^ l " ^ 2 J anc* ^lf~^2f’ t i^e 
game is called an almost zero-sum game« One would intuitively expect that 
for almost zero-sum games, an approximation for S, and S0 using only a 
small number of terms would yield cost functions close to the exact Nash 
equilibrium cost functions» The degree of approximation of the Nash 
equilibrium cost functions is discussed in Section 4.
3« Dependence of Nash Cost Functions on Imbedding Parameter
In Section 2, parameter imbedding was introduced in the generalized 
matrix Riccati equations in such a way that when e = l, the imbedded 
generalized matrix Riccati equation (8) reduces to the original generalized
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matrix Riccati equation (7). Hence the series in (13) and (14) when e = l 
are the Nash solutions for the cost functions in (3). One might ask if 
the series in (13) and (14) for any e ^ 1 could correspond to Nash 
solutions for some other cost functions* It is readily verified that 
indeed (13) and (14) are Nash solutions for the differential game (1) and 
cost functions
J.l
_ JL ~ 2 xl S . x £ +'i f (x'Q.x +u!R. „u . ~f ~if ~f v ~ + u*. R. .u.)dt (25)
o
where S^, Q^, iL ^ , and are defined in (9), (10), (11), and (12), 
for i = 1,2, j = 2 when i = 1 and j =1 when i = 2 , One way of verifying 
that (13) and (14) are the Nash solutions for (25) for the differential 
game (1) is to apply the result in [1 ] for obtaining the generalized 
matrix Riccati equations. Furthermore the cost functions Jj and 
reduce to and of (3) when e = l, and satisfy the zero-sum condition 
+ J2 = 0 when e = 0.
Although e enters linearly in Slf5 52fs 2l’ and , the dependence 
on e of R^, ^225 R12s anc* R21 are muc^ more complicated. However, the 
matrices in the imbedded generalized, matrix Riccati equation are linear in 
e. This linearity simplifies not only the calculation of the power series 
for and S^, but also the calculation of and J^. If the imbedding 
in [4] were to be applied, the imbedded weighting matrices in and 
would be linear in e but the matrices in the imbedded generalized matrix 
Riccati equations would have complex dependence on e.
The Nash strategies for players 1. and 2 for the cost function in
(25) are
11
--1 ,
u. - - R i . b ! s „(e , t ) x- 1 ~11 ~x ~i. 5 ~ (26)
where S^(e,t) and S2 (e,t) are solutions of (8) for i = 1,2. The solutions 
cover a class of games ranging from a zero-sum game when e = 0 to the 
original nonzero-sum game when e = l.
In Section 2, it has been assumed that there exists a unique 
solution for the imbedded generalized matrix Riccati equations, for all t 
in [tQ,t^] and for all e in an interval that includes [0,1], This insures 
the existence and uniqueness of a Nash solution for the imbedded nonzero-sum 
game with cost functions in (25). Sufficient conditions which guarantee 
existence of the generalized matrix Riccati equations for the nonzero-sum 
game were derived by Rhodes [3]. In terms of the notation of this paper, 
these conditions are: S ^  + $2f — Qf + Q2 > 0?
S22 ~12 — ^or a^  [to5tf] anc^  e in I ; and the existence and
uniqueness of the solutions of the matrix Riccati equations for two zero-sum 
games, one with cost and another with cost -j . Furthermore a sufficient 
condition for the existence and uniqueness of the solution of the matrix 
Riccati equation for a zero sum game with a cost function is that the 
relative controllability matrix
^11 + £21 — and
J 0( t f S s)[B. . - 15n 21 + B, 5 12 5^3j08 (tf ,s)ds > 0 (27)
is positive semi-definite for all t in [tQ,tf] and for all e in I,[3]. 
Similarly, for a zero-sum game with cost function -J2 a sufficient condition 
is that the relative controllability matrix
f . - 1  . - 1
"J 0(tf,s)[B1 R21 B| + B 2 R22 Bj]0*(tf,s)ds > 0 (28)
12
is positive semi-definite for all t in [tQ,t^] and for all e in I . The 
matrix 0(t,T) is the transition matrix for the system in (1). From the 
results in [3] a sufficient condition for the existence and uniqueness of 
the solution for the resulting zero-sum game when e is set to zero in
(25) is that
0(tf,s) [Bx 5ii^ll”5 2 1)Sll Si B2 S22(S22"Sl2)S22 ~2] $' (tf5s)ds > 0 (29)
is positive semi-definite for all t in [t ,t^]. But if (27) and (28) are 
satisfied for all e in I (including e=0), it follows that (29) is also 
satisfied» Hence (27) and (28) guarantee the existence and uniqueness of 
the solution of (18) (and hence of S^(03t) and ¡^(Ojt). The higher order 
terms in the series of (13) and (14) are solutions of (23) and (24) which 
are linear differential equations with continuous coefficients and continuous 
forcing functions. Hence there exist unique solutions to these equations.
4. Degree of Approximation of Cost Functions
In this section the effects of truncation of the strategies of 
the players on the cost functions are examined. The power series of and 
in e define the functions for all es and when these are evaluated at 
e =1 the values are the Nash cost functions for the original nonzero-sum 
game. The cost functions for truncated strategies will be investigated 
by comparing the coefficients of their McLaurin’s series with those for 
Nash cost functions.
Case a . Both players use the Nash strategies of (26) for i = 192. 
Denoting the Nash cost function for player 1 by J^a and that for player 2
13
by J0 j the cost functions are [1]:Za
J = i x' S. x , i = 1,2, (30)la ~ '»X ~
where is given by (8). The next three cases are compared with this 
exact Nash equilibrium situation«
Case b . Player 1 uses the strategy
_ - l
u. = "R-- B’ x (31)~I ~11 ~l ~l ~
where .
m-1 i 9 S.
Mi - 2 h- <32)i=0 l .  oe
but player 2 uses the exact Nash strategy in (26). Denote the cost function 
for player 1 by J ^ and that for player 2 by ^ b ”
Since the cost functions for linear-quadratic differential games 
with linear feedback strategies are always quadratic in x, an<3- ^ b  are 
of the form
Jib  =
_ JL I P.X
~ 1 ~
(33)
where P^ satisfies [1 ]
Si -  - (a- I A - k & ' h .  - ! 252) -S i-g J iS i  -SjEjSj» !i< e* V
(34)
where
E. - F. E. + F. E. - F. E. + F.- ~i ~i , ~i ~i - ~i ~i , _ ~i ~iE. = — o---  + e -— ; F. = - -— o—  + e — o---~i 2 2 5 ~i (35)
Si  "  i? i ’ ~2 ~ ~23 (36)
14
and as before j =2 when i = 1 and j =1 when i = 2 „ E. and F. are definedJ J ~1 ~L
in (16) and (17), and is defined in (9).
It can be shown that
lb
as-
d*jla
e=0 de1
, i = 0,1 ,...,2m-l
e=0
and
aij2b
de1
3 J2a
s=0
de1
, i = 0,1 ,... ,m.
e=0
(37)
(38)
The approximation property in (37) is the same as for optimal control [7,8]. 
Thus if the first m terms of the McLaurin's series for u^ are equal to the 
first m terms of the Nash solution (26) with i =1 for player 1, and if 
player 2 uses the Nash strategy in (26) with i = 2, then the first 2m terms 
of the McLaurin's series of will be equal to the first 2m terms of the 
McLaurin's series of the exact Nash cost function J^a » Player 2 will not 
achieve the exact Nash pay-off function J^a but (38) will be satisfied. 
Relation (37) is proved using the same arguments as in [8]. That is,
P^ - = r is formed. Using the differential equations for P^ and S^, it
is straightforward to show that d^Th/ds^ = 0 at s = 0, for k - 0,...,2m-l 
when i = 1 and for k = 0,..,,m when i = 2 .
Case c. Player 1 uses the strategy in (31) and (32) and player 2 
uses the strategy
(39)
k-l ei
M, = £ 7 7 — Ti-0 x* de
(40)
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Denoting the cost functions for players 1 and 2 by and ,
then
Jic = ^ ~'~i ~ » i - 1,2 (41)
where L. satisfies
L. = -(A-E-M- - eL h , )  'L. - L. (A-E1M - ELM.) - 6. -M.E.M. -M.F.M.~1~1 ~2~2 ~i ~i ~ ~ 1~1 ~2~z ~i
L . ( e 3t _) = S. . .i v 3 f ~if (42)
It can be shown that
aijlc
Be1
S1j la
e=0 Be
• - n i • f 2m-l*)l = 0,1 3... ,mint ^ j (43)
e=0
and
d1J2c
Be1
dLJ2a
e=0
Be1
3 i = 0j1 3..o,minif2k-ljm (44)
e=0
The derivations of (43) and (44) are analogous to those of (37) and (38)» 
Thus if both players use first order corrections on nominally zero-sum 
strategies, the resulting cost functions match the exact Nash cost 
functions to second order.
Case d. Player 1 uses the truncated strategy in (31) and (32) 
and player 2 uses the optimal strategy which minimizes knowing that 
player 1 is using the strategy in (31) and (32).
The optimal strategy for player 2 is
(45)
16
where
£2 = - ( A - E ^ ) ’^  +^2 E2K2 -Q2 ^(e.tj) =S2f. (46)
The cost functions are
Jid = i  Z ’ Z± 5 > 1 = 1>2 j (47)
where satisfies
£1 = -I2& )  - -I2£2>’S i -i?ili£r2i - £2!2£2 > 5i <•»**> = Iif
(48)
The cost functions and J have the property that
d1J
I d
d e 1
e=0
j
de"
la 5 1 "" ^ y (49)
e=0
and
2d a1j 2a
de" e=0 de1
0 j 1 j o • • ,m< (50)
e=0
Cases b, c, and d are for player 1 using a truncated strategy and 
player 2 using either Nash, truncated, or optimal strategy knowing that 
player 1 uses a truncated strategy. By symmetry the roles of players 
1 and 2 may be interchanged to investigate two other possible strategies 
for player 1 when player 2 uses truncated strategy. The comparisons in 
the above cases are with respect to the exact Nash strategy of case a.
Cost functions for cases b, c, and d may be compared among themselves 
instead of the one for case a by deriving differential equations for
17
P. -L., P. - K. , and L. - K. , for i = 1,2, and investigating to what order '■»'i ~i ~i '*'1 ~1
their partial derivatives with respect to e are zero identically. The 
results are
and
sijlb hlj lc
de1 e=0
de1
3
e=0
Sij2b dij2c
de1 e=0 Se1
3
e=0
sljib 3ijid
de*- e=0 de1 e=0
3lj2b *lj2d
cie1 e=0
de1
3
e=0
dijilc 3ijid
e=0
de1
3
e=0
3ij2c 3lj2d
de1 e=0 de^-
3
s=0
i “ Ojljoo.jk
1 "" 0,1 ,0003k
i  —  0 j 13» o o jin
l  ■“ Ocjltjoo.*)2m 1
i = 0,l5,o.3mini™}
i = 0,13..»gmin^™,^  °
(51)
(52)
(53)
(54)
(55)
(56)
For a given initial state, the functions may be plotted against the scalar
parameter e. Jla(e) and J2a ^  are the exact Nastl cost functions for a 
class of almost zero sum games, including a zero-sum game when. e = 0,  and 
the original nonzero-sum game when e = l0 Equations (37), (38) 3 (43), (44) s 
(49), and (50) indicate the closeness of the curves for Jlc9 anc* Jld
to J^a , and the closeness of the curves for ^ b 9 J2c5 anc* J 2d tC> J2a*
18
Equations (51) to (56) show that the different truncated strategies
compared among themselves yield cost functions which are close to each
other. For example, in (51) and (52), it is seen that the truncation
order for player 1 has no effect on the comparison of the cost functions
between Cases b and c. In fact when k “*00, Case c becomes Case b so that
J. becomes identical to and J0 becomes identical to . Similarly, lc lb 2c 2b
from (53) and (54), it is seen that when m “*00, Cases b, d, and a become the 
same. For a comparison of Cases c and d, (55) and (56) show that the cost 
function differences depend on m and k because the strategy of player 2 in 
Case d depends on the truncation m of player 1 and the strategies are both 
truncated for Case c and these depend on both m and k.
From the above four cases, it is seen that if player 1 uses a 
truncated strategy, and if player 2 uses a Nash strategy, the cost 
function of player 2 is not. as close to the exact Nash value as that of 
player 1, in the sense of (37) and (38). Player 2 will achieve the same 
degree of approximation to mth order in the sense of (44) by truncating 
his strategy to kth order where k is more than half as large as i. If 
player 2 uses the optimal strategy which minimizes knowing that player 1 
uses a truncated strategy his cost function would not be too different 
from what he would obtain had he used a truncated Nash strategy, in the 
sense of (44) and (50).
In solving for the cost functions in MeLaurin's series form, 
various partial derivatives with respect to e of S^, P^, L^, Kb are needed. 
However, the homogeneous parts of the differential equations for these 
partial derivatives evaluated at e =0 are all the same. The forcing
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terms are easily formed because of the simple manner in which e appears in 
the weighting matrices of the equations.
5« Examples
\  Example 1: A velocity-controlled pursuit-evasion same as in [1 ]
is considered here to illustrate the procedure
r = v - v P e
J_ - i  & r'rf  + i  \ (v’v /c + v ’v /c )dt p p f f c ^ N p p p  e e  pe
Je " CTerfrf + v l y J c a J d t .
2 2
e f f  ^ o ' e e e P P eP
(57)
(58)
(59)
Consider the case cr =cr = c c = 1, a = c /e = 0. b = c / c =0,P e p e p pe e ep *
2
^ ~ Cp/ce ~ 4 3 and t^ — 0.5. The 0th order term is found from (18)
S = 0.75 S , S(0.5) = 1, (60)
Thus
sx(09t) = S(t) , S2(0,t) = -S(t) (61)
The first order terms are found from (23)
as as 3s
= 1-5 S1 (0,t) ¿ f -  + 0.25(Sx(0,t))Z , ^ = 0 (62)
t=0.5
as2 as, , as,
= 1-5 S1 (0,t) - 2.75(S1 (0,t))^ , ^ = 0. (63)
t=0.5
The 2nd order terms are found from (24)
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Similarly 3rd and higher order terms can be found by solving (24) 
for that order.
Approximate strategies are then found from truncated series of (13)
and (14) with e=l. The costs to pursuer and evader when 4th order
2 2
it (Q) it (0 )truncations are used are found to be 0.591 ( 2 ' ) and -0.241 while.
2 Z 2 fO ) r  ft) )the exact Nash strategies*yields = 0.593 (— ^-^) and = - 0.241 ( — ^ '*-) .
Example 2; An acceleration controlled pursuit-evasion game 
closely related to that given in [1] is considered
r = V r (0) = 1 (66)
v = a - a p e v(0) = 0 (67)
Jp = rfrf + i  t
0.5
(r’r + a ’a )dt 
) P P
(68)
J = -0.6 r’r,. e f f
0.5
+  è  J (“1.2r’r+0.4 a^a^)dt . (69)
0
*
In the two examples of this section, R ^  = 0 so that the sufficient
conditions for the existence of solutions for and in [3] are not 
satisfied. However in these examples, it can be shown that the solutions 
for and exist.
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Presence of quadratic terms of the states in the integral has 
the following meaning: evader (pursuer) wants to maximize (minimize) the
distance not only at the final instant but also during the. course of 
pursuit. In general this problem may not be transformed into one of 
velocity-controlled pursuit-evasion game. Thus to obtain exact Nash 
strategies, it will be necessary to solve coupled Riceati-type matrix 
equations. Using Oth order truncations, one obtains = 1.615, J2 = -0.884. 
Using first order truncations, one obtains = 1.490, = -0.856. When
2nd order truncations are used, = 1.476, =”0.860 are obtained. The
exact Nash strategies yield = 1.478, =”0.862.
At t = 0.25 S1 (ll) S1 (12) S1 (22) s2(ii) 1 S2 (12) S2 (22)
Exact Nash Strategy 2.30 0.543 0.133 -1.49 -0.336 -0.081
0th Order truncation 1.89 0.437 0.106 -1.89 -0.437 -0.106
1st Order truncation 2.32 0.548 0.134 -1.50 -0.338 -0.081
2nd Order truncation 2.30 0.543 0.133 -1.49 -0.335 -0.081 j
> rt rt II O S1 (ll) S1 (12) Sx(22) S2 (ll) s2 (12) S2 (22)
Exact Nash Strategy 2.96 1.34 0.647 -1.72 -0.712 -0.331
0th Order truncation 2.26 0.990 0.471 -2.26 -0.990 -0.471
1st Order truncation 3.15 1.44 0.694 -1.82 -0.760 -0.355
2nd Order truncation 3.00 1.37 0.658 -1.70 -0.700 -0.325
Table 1. Comparison of S for Example 2.
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6. Concluding Remarks
By a simple linear parameter imbedding of the generalized matrix 
Riccati equations, strategies for two-person linear quadratic nonzero-sum 
differential games are obtained in series form. For almost zero-sum games 
approximate Nash cost functions may be obtained with much less computation 
using lower order equations in contrast to the exact solution which 
involves solving higher order equations. The method requires solving a 
matrix Riccati equation for a zero-sum game with half as many variables 
as the original problem, and a set of linear equations with the same 
homogeneous part. The linear equations are also of lower dimensionality. 
Finally, the effect of truncating the series on the cost functions are 
discussed.
The numerical examples show that low order truncations yield 
reasonably accurate results. In general the method would be most useful 
when the cost functionscorrespond to almost zero-sum games, and when the 
dimensionality is high. Although realistic games are usually not linear 
with quadratic cost functions, one possible method of obtaining an 
approximation to Nash strategies is to expand the cost function and 
differential equations in Taylor series and consider strategies which are 
also Taylor's series. The first order approximations in the control 
strategies are based on a linearized game with quadratic cost functions. 
This approach is analogous to that of Albrekht and Lukes as applied to 
control problems [9,10].
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Yes
Form approximate 
strategies from ( 32 )
FP—2305
Solve Ki* order terms from
( 2 4 )  using 0 ^  . . . . (  K - l ) iti
order terms obtained above 
----------------------- -----------------------
K=K+ I
Figure 1. Flow chart summarizing the sequence of calculations for 
determining truncated Nash equilibrium strategies.
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----------- Exact Nash solution
---------- Oth order truncation
----------  |st o r c j e r  truncation
---------- 2 ^  order truncation
---------- 4th order truncation
F P -2306
Figure 2. S^(t) and S^Ct) for various degrees of truncation for Example 1.
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game. Cost functions corresponding to truncated solutions are compared with those 
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